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A B S T R A C T S   
Reliable decarbonisation policies can only be developed with a thorough understanding of how consumers 
choose between energy technologies. Current energy models assume optimal consumer decisions which may 
result in expectations of the effectiveness of climate policies that are far too optimistic. Prospect Theory, on the 
other hand, aims to model real-life choices, based on empirical observations that losses have a relatively larger 
influence on decisions than gains, relative to a reference point. Here, we show for the first time how loss aversion 
can be included into a global energy model with high spatial resolution, using heating technology uptake as a 
case study. We simulate the future heating technology diffusion for 59 world regions covering the globe, with 
and without the consideration of loss aversion. We find that ignoring the implications of loss aversion over-
estimates the market uptake of renewables, in individual countries as well as on the global level. As a conse-
quence, loss aversion results in higher projected CO2 emissions by households, and the need for much stronger 
policy instruments for achieving decarbonisation targets. In the case of residential heating, a carbon tax of 200 
€/tCO2 is projected to reduce overall emission levels to a similar extent than a carbon tax of 100 €/tCO2 without 
the consideration of loss aversion. Even for similar degrees of decarbonisation, accounting for loss aversion 
implies substantial changes in the underlying technology composition: technology choices become subject to a 
‘conservative shift’ towards low-carbon technologies which are relatively less efficient, but already more 
established in local markets.   
1. Introduction 
The Paris Agreement aims at limiting global warming to well below 
2 �C, which requires a rapid decarbonisation of the energy system 
worldwide [1]. Decarbonisation scenarios and policies aimed at the 
uptake of low-carbon technologies are usually analysed by means of 
energy models, either on their own or as part of larger ensembles (e.g., 
integrated assessment models) [2]. At their core, they describe how the 
technology composition of the energy system might change over time, 
and project the resulting influence on energy use and greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. 
Large-scale energy models are typically based on optimisation al-
gorithms, which aim at identifying feasible pathways at the lowest 
overall system cost (given the specified constraints, such as a carbon 
budget) [3]. Underlying such algorithms are the assumptions of rational 
decision-making, in form of cost minimisation or utility maximisation, at 
the whole system level [4]. Such a method is arguably useful in a 
normative frame, as it enables to identify desirable and feasible system 
configurations. However, in a positive descriptive sense, it implies a 
view in which energy technologies are solely rationally chosen based on 
cost and performance characteristics by a social planner or representa-
tive agent, which is not how society works. In reality, technological 
change depends on the uncoordinated decisions of millions of people, 
who act according to their different individual needs and perceptions, 
and different types of biases compared to the normative frame [5]. 
In particular, behavioural research shows, with substantial amounts 
of empirics, that human decision-making systematically deviates from 
the rational choice assumptions as defined by classical economics [6–9]. 
This implies that the real-world impacts of decarbonisation policies on 
technology choices could be very different from what would be expected 
based on rational decision-making [10–12]. Where this matters most is 
in policy-making: how to ensure that technological change policy is 
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successful, and that emissions targets are met? This is particularly 
relevant for policies aimed at energy end-use sectors, such as road 
transport or residential heating, where most decisions are made by 
consumers, whose behaviour is furthest from classical rational choice 
theory [13]. One of the key questions to be solved is how a more realistic 
representation of human behaviour in large-scale quantitative energy 
models can be achieved, to better inform a roll-out of successful GHG 
emission mitigation policies [14–17]. 
A well-established alternative to the prevalent assumptions of 
rational choice theory is Prospect Theory, which offers an empirically 
validated framework for describing how individuals make decisions in 
reality, independently of normative considerations of optimality 
[18–20]. For choices between consumption goods, the central element 
of Prospect Theory is loss aversion, which describes the observation that 
losses have a relatively larger impact on observed decisions than gains, 
relative to a subjective reference point [18–20]. On average, the impact 
of losses is found to be around twice as strong, compared to equally 
seized gains [21]. Following the classical experiments on loss aversion in 
product choice by Knetsch [22] and Kahneman et al. [23], this behav-
ioural pattern was reported for consumer choices ranging from eggs [24] 
to real estate [25]. 
Loss aversion has not only been observed in human adults, but also 
for children [26], and even for capuchin monkeys [27,28]. Given its 
pervasiveness, this suggests that loss aversion might be an evolutionarily 
evolved cognitive strategy, and hence part of our neurological inheri-
tance. Indeed, Tom et al. [29] described that the measured activity in 
involved brain regions is more sensitive to losses than to gains. One 
potential explanation is an evolutionary adaptation to survival-related 
challenges, resulting in an increased sensitivity to negative emotions 
such as fear and anxiety, and hence a bias against losses [29,30]. This 
points towards an evolutionarily hard-wired property of human 
behaviour, with critical importance for the effective design of energy 
and climate policies [10,31]. 
In the domain of energy, choice experiments in the USA and eight 
European countries indicate that loss-averse decision-makers are less 
likely to buy energy efficient technologies, such as alternative fuel ve-
hicles and energy-efficient light bulbs [32,33]. The reason is that higher 
upfront costs are often evaluated as losses, which therefore have a 
relatively stronger impact on decisions than future energy savings 
(which are evaluated as gains). Similar effects of loss aversion on con-
sumer preferences are reported for time-of-use electricity tariffs [34,35], 
gasoline demand [36], cars [37], and renewables [38,39]. Closest to our 
work, Safarzynska and van den Bergh [40] included loss aversion into a 
regression-based model of passenger car uptake in Germany, and 
showed that loss-averse consumers buy on average less fuel-efficient 
cars than rational agents. Knobloch and Mercure [11] suggested how 
loss aversion could be integrated into a basic choice model for energy 
technology uptake, and that this can predict more accurately observed 
energy efficiency investments by firms. 
Still, despite the overwhelming empirical evidence, loss aversion has 
not yet been considered in any energy model which covers one or more 
countries. Here, we show how loss aversion can be included into a 
simulation model of heating technology uptake, FTT:Heat. This model’s 
representation of technology uptake is strongly empirical, based on 
detailed regional datasets of consumer markets. It simulates future 
technology diffusion in 59 world regions covering the globe, which al-
lows to analyse policy scenarios for individual countries as well as on the 
global level. Importantly, the technological trajectory is not based on 
economy-wide optimisation (to answer the question what should ideally 
happen), but on a dynamical bottom-up simulation of individual choices 
of heterogeneous agents with bounded rationality (to answer the ques-
tion what would happen over time). As a dynamical simulation model, 
FTT:Heat is thus particularly well suited to account for real-world im-
perfections of human decision-making, such as loss aversion. 
We contribute to the ongoing discussion on how to increase the 
behavioural realism of energy and integrated assessment models 
[41–44], which has so far neglected the possible influence of loss 
aversion. At the example of the residential heating sector, we analyse to 
which extent loss aversion influences model projections of technological 
change and the effectiveness of climate policies, both on the global level 
and on the level of individual countries. To evaluate the relevance of loss 
aversion, we simulate a current trends scenario and four decarbon-
isation policy scenarios, involving different levels of residential carbon 
taxes and subsidy payments. We show that loss aversion has important 
implications for policy-making in individual countries, as market-based 
decarbonisation policies may need to become much more stringent to 
overcome the loss aversion effect. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Loss aversion as part of prospect theory 
The concept of loss aversion originates in the seminal work by 
Kahneman and Tversky [18]. Their research presents empirical evidence 
for systematic violations of classical utility theory in decision-making of 
people, and proposes Prospect Theory as a descriptive framework which 
is consistent with such observations [for a comprehensive review, see 
45]. As a positive theory of choice, it aims at describing how people 
actually behave (as observed empirically). This theory contrasts with the 
standard normative nature of utility and rational choice theory, which 
describe how people ought to behave, if they were acting according to a 
set of pre-defined theoretical axioms (constituting the ‘economic man’ of 
economic analysis) [46]. 
While the initial formulation of Prospect Theory focused on 
describing risky choices between probabilistic payoffs (such as playing 
the lottery) [18], the framework was soon extended to choices between 
consumption goods which differ in attributes [9,20]. Centrally, such 
choices are found to be reference-dependent and subject to loss aversion, 
relative to the decision-maker’s subjective reference point. 
Reference dependence reflects experimental evidence that people do 
not derive utility from absolute levels of wealth or pleasure (as in clas-
sical utility theory), but from changes relative to a reference point 
(usually the status quo). As illustrated in Fig. 1, positive changes are 
evaluated as gains, and negative changes as losses. The fundamental 
reasoning behind reference dependence is derived from the psychology 
of sensual perceptions (such as seeing or feeling), which are more sen-
sitive towards changes in the external environment (such as in bright-
ness or temperature) than towards their absolute levels [7]. For 
example, most people can only identify relative differences in sound 
frequencies, and are unable to name absolute sound frequencies without 
external reference [47]. 
Loss aversion describes the empirical observation that peoples’ 
choices are more sensitive to losses than to gains, relative to their sub-
jective reference points. Even when both are of the same absolute 
magnitude (e.g., in monetary terms), they are perceived and valued 
differently in the process of subjective decision-making. In early ex-
periments, it was estimated that the relative impact of losses on choices 
is 2.25 times stronger, which is taken as an empirical measure of the 
degree of loss aversion [19]. In an experiment on car choice, Gaechter 
et al. [48] estimate that 88% of participants are loss-averse, with an 
interquartile range for the loss aversion coefficient of 1.3–3.0. 
Due to reference-dependent loss aversion, a move away from the 
reference point towards an alternative is perceived as relatively unat-
tractive, even if gains are two times larger in objective magnitude than 
losses. As a result, people perceive deviations from their current situa-
tion as less attractive than what rational choice theory would imply, and 
therefore show stronger than expected preferences for the status quo and 
their current entitlements — referred to as ‘status quo bias’ and 
‘endowment effect’ [9,49]. Importantly, the asymmetric effect of loss 
aversion is conceptually different from behavioural time preferences 
(discount rates), which may lead to a systematic undervaluation of 
future cost savings: discount rates are applied to all losses and gains, 
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irrespective of any reference point.1 
2.2. Modelling loss aversion in energy technology choices 
The starting point of our work is the generalised reference-dependent 
model of consumer choice by Tversky and Kahneman [20], which we 
adapt to energy technology choices by consumers. Conceptually, our 
model considers a choice between two technology options (i and j) that 
differ on two or more valued dimensions (d) (see Fig. 1a). When 
comparing technologies i and j, we denote the implied difference on 
each dimension relative to the reference point as Δdx;i→j ¼ dx;j   dx;i, 
where x is the dimension, i the reference point and j the alternative 
option. Each difference is evaluated as a loss or gain (i.e., as a relative 
disadvantage or advantage), relative to the reference point. The value of 
each loss or gain, vðΔdx;i→jÞ, is determined by a two-part value function 
of the form 
v
 
Δdx;i→j
�
¼
�
Δdx;i→j if Δdx;i→j � 0
Δdx;i→j�λ if Δdx;i→j < 0 (1)  
where λ is the coefficient of loss aversion. We denote the overall eval-
uation of choice option j from reference point i as vði →jÞ, which equals 
the sum of evaluated differences over all dimensions x (such as upfront 
costs and energy costs): 
vði → jÞ¼
X
x
v
 
Δdx;i→j
�
(2) 
For λ ¼ 1, the model yields the classical rational choice model of 
economic theory. For λ > 1, however, the evaluation of choice options 
becomes asymmetric: due to loss aversion, any difference on a dimen-
sion has a greater impact on choices when it is evaluated as a loss, and a 
shift in the reference point can lead to a reversal of preferences (as losses 
can turn into gains). For the loss aversion specification of the model, we 
use a default parameterisation of λ ¼ 2:25 [based on the original ex-
periments by 20], and analyse the sensitivity of results for a range of λ 
between 1 and 3 [based on 48].2 
As an example, suppose that a person needs to replace a heating 
system, and that preferences for this choice are determined by two di-
mensions (d1 and d2): upfront capital cost (i.e., the purchase price and 
eventual installation costs), and the (discounted) total operating costs 
during a technology’s lifetime.3 Without loss aversion (λ ¼ 1), choices 
are straightforward: When one technology has lower total costs, it 
should be strictly preferred. When total costs of both technology options 
are identical, any objective decision-maker should be indifferent be-
tween both options. Preferences should not depend on the technology 
which is being replaced. 
With loss aversion (λ > 1), preferences depend on the decision- 
maker’s subjective reference point, which is potentially ambiguous [and 
remains uninterpreted in 20]. We adopt here the interpretation of the 
current endowment hypothesis, which intuitively assumes that an in-
dividual’s reference point is their currently owned bundle of goods [50], 
so the currently owned technology in our specific case. Due to loss 
aversion, relative disadvantages of an option (losses) now loom larger 
than relative advantages (gains). This suggests a relatively stronger 
preference for the status quo technology, compared to preferences 
without loss aversion — even if both technologies are identical in overall 
costs. It is sufficient if they differ in their underlying dimensions. 
Technology adoption within a larger population depends on the 
distributed decisions of heterogenous people, who act in different con-
texts and can have different perceptions of the available options. Simi-
larly, technologies and their cost dimensions are subject to variation. For 
example, when considering the choice between a gas-fired heating 
Fig. 1. Reference-dependence and loss aversion in product choice.(a) In a riskless choice between two consumption goods (options X and Y), losses and gains 
correspond to differences in their individual attributes (dimensions 1 and 2), relative to the reference point. Switching from option X to Y implies a loss in dimension 
1 (   Δd, shown in red), and a parallel gain in dimension 2 (þ Δd, shown in green). (b) Losses and gains are evaluated according to the empirically derived Prospect 
Theory value function. In case of loss aversion, losses are assigned a larger subjective decision value than gains. Even if both are equal in absolute objective 
magnitude (e.g., monetary value), switching to the alternative option would thus be perceived as unattractive. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this 
figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.) 
1 Although loss aversion and discounting are conceptually different, they can 
thus lead to similar patterns in empirical data on decision-making, such as the 
typically observed relatively larger impact of upfront costs on energy technol-
ogy choices. When loss aversion is not considered, empirically estimated dis-
count rates are therefore likely to be biased upwards, as they also capture the 
(reference-dependent) effect of loss aversion. Disentangling empirical estimates 
of time preferences/discount rates from the influence of loss aversion is 
possible, but requires richer datasets [for an example, see [33]. 
2 Note that for 5% of individuals, the estimated degree of loss aversion is 
negative (λ < 1), which implies a larger sensitivity to gains than to losses [48]. 
However, the average degree of loss aversion is highly unlikely to be negative 
within larger groups, so that the (hypothetical) case of λ < 1 is not considered 
here.  
3 Note that it remains debated in the literature whether loss aversion applies 
to price and quality dimensions in the same way [50]. For the case of product 
choices, a review by Neumann and Boeckenholt [21] finds no evidence that 
consumers show lower loss aversion for price dimensions, relative to quality 
dimensions (based on a meta-analysis of 109 effect observations). 
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system and an electric heat pump, both technology options exist in 
various different configurations, and may have different cost charac-
teristics in different contexts (such as different climatic or building 
conditions). For representing such diversity, we extend the model to the 
case of a heterogenous population, making technology choices over time 
[based on 11,51]. 
Within each simulation period t, we calculate the fraction of the 
population which would prefer technology j over technology i. This 
fraction is denoted as Fi→j;t, and equals 
Fi→j;t ¼ Si;t  1�P½vtði → jÞ> 0�: (3)  
Si;t  1 is the market share of technology i in the previous period, which is 
taken as a proxy for the share of the population for which technology i is 
their current reference point. P½vtði →jÞ> 0� is the probability that 
switching from technology i to j is seen as attractive in the current 
period, based on the distributions of evaluated differences in technology 
dimensions. 
2.3. Modelling heating technology choices 
As a case study, we proceed by implementing the reference- 
dependent model of technology choice into a bottom-up model of 
technology diffusion in the residential heating sector, FTT:Heat [for a 
full model description and further details, see 51,52]. The sector is 
well-suited for studying the impact of loss aversion on technology up-
take: Decisions are (overwhelmingly) made by consumers, but not pre-
dominantly influenced by other interfering cultural factors (such as 
status consideration in mobility) [53,54].4 At the same time, together 
with passenger road transport, the sector accounts for the largest share 
of direct GHG emissions by households [55]. 
FTT:Heat simulates the uptake and replacement of 13 different 
heating technologies in 59 world regions covering the globe, up until 
2050, from a bottom-up perspective: under given behavioural assump-
tions, which technologies would households prefer, and how fast can 
new technologies grow within the market? As a simulation model, it is 
thus particularly well suited to integrate real-world imperfections of 
human decision-making, such as loss aversion. As part of the integrated 
assessment model E3ME-FTT-GENIE, it is linked to models of the power 
sector, wider economy and climate [56,57]. 
Fig. 2 presents a schematic overview of the central model compo-
nents of FTT:Heat, and how loss aversion is added to the model’s 
decision-making core. The exogenous model driver is the projected 
annual demand for heat as an energy service. For each individual region, 
this demand depends on assumptions regarding future levels of popu-
lation growth, household income and the thermal insulation of houses 
[as described in 51]. 
At the heart of FTT:Heat, in each simulation step (set to three 
months) it is simulated which technologies are chosen by households to 
fulfil their demand for space and water heating, if they were to buy or 
replace a heating system in this period. Technology choices are deter-
mined by a pairwise comparison of all available technology options, 
based on distributed costs parameters5: upfront investment costs, 
operating costs (energy costs plus maintenance-repair costs), and an 
empirically calibrated ‘intangible’ cost component. The latter represents 
technology characteristics which are valued by households (such as 
convenience or co-benefits), but not captured by the engineering-based 
cost data [for a description of the methodology, see 51]. As a repre-
sentation of heterogeneity, investment and operating costs are 
distributed around their mean values [for the detailed data, see 51,52]. 
All cost values are normalised to the generation of one unit of useful 
heat, and future operating costs are discounted [by a rate of 9%, based 
on 64]. Upfront investment costs are subject to endogenous future cost 
decreases, as a function of each technology’s cumulatively installed 
capacity [‘learning by doing’, with cost reductions between 10 and 30% 
for every additional doubling of the cumulative capacity, based on 65], 
which makes the model highly path-dependent. 
In the original model specification, available technology options are 
compared to each other without consideration of a reference point, 
simply be evaluating symmetric cost distributions. Formally, pairwise 
comparisons take the form of binary logits in which the relative fre-
quency of choices happening is weighted by their existing level of 
popularity, which generates S-shaped evolutionary diffusion curves 
endogenously [66,67]. 
For the inclusion of loss aversion, we have added the reference- 
dependent model from Section 2.2 to the original decision-making 
core of FTT:Heat. For this purpose, the loss aversion model from Sec-
tion 2.1 (Eq. (1)–(3)) is extended from two to thirteen choice options, 
which are compared to each other on three dimensions. If the coefficient 
of loss-aversion in Eq. (1) is set to λ ¼ 1, the new decision-making core 
of FTT:Heat yields the same results as its original version, in which the 
comparison of considered options remains tied to the assumptions of 
(bounded) rationality. This allows an easy comparison of model results 
under alternative assumptions on decision-making, with and without 
loss aversion. 
Loss aversion is implemented into FTT:Heat in the following way: 
First, in each simulation step (set to three months) and for each region, 
the model estimates the perceived value of potential losses and gains 
Fig. 2. Integration of loss aversion into the FTT:Heat model. The decision- 
making core of FTT:Heat simulates technology choices by heterogenous 
households from a bottom-up perspective. Technology choices by households 
are based on distributed technology costs and empirically estimated ‘intangible’ 
cost components. In the new model specification, reference-dependent loss 
aversion is added to the decision-making core, in order to simulate more real-
istically how differences between technologies are subjectively perceived and 
evaluated by households. 
4 This is not supposed to imply that technology choices in residential heating 
are unrelated to social or cultural factors.  
5 Technology cost data are taken from [58–62]. Residential fuel prices are 
based on [63]. More details on the data and assumptions are given in previous 
publications, see [51,52]. 
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from technology switching, vðΔdx;i→jÞ, for any possible pair of technol-
ogies, based on Eq. (1). For the case of heating technologies, it is 
assumed that losses and gains can result from three dimensions: upfront 
investment costs, operating costs, and the ‘intangible’ cost component. 
As in the original model specification, investment and operating costs 
are distributed around their mean values, as a representation of het-
erogeneity. For any possible pair of heating technologies, the distribu-
tion of losses and gains is estimated by means of a Monte Carlo 
simulation.6 
Second, for each comparison of two technology options, the overall 
attractiveness of technology switching, vði →jÞ, is estimated as the sum of 
individual losses and gains over all considered dimensions, according to 
Eq. (2). 
Third, choice preferences Fi→j;t are estimated for each possible 
combination of technologies, based on Eq. (3) and the distributions of 
evaluated losses and gains. The distribution of reference points is taken 
to be the market shares of technologies in the previous period (Si;t  1), in 
each respective region.7 
Last but not least, we derive the substitution of market shares from 
heating technology i to j in period Δt, as: 
ΔSi→j ¼Fi→j;tτ  1i Si;t  1Sj;t  1Δt (4)  
τi is the average expected lifetime of technology i. Combined with the 
market share of i in the previous period (Si;t  1), it is used to approximate 
the fraction of technology i which needs to be replaced. The rate of 
substitutions is dynamically constrained by technology j’s market share 
in the previous period, as a stylised representation of limited production 
capacities on part of industry and limited information on part of 
households [67,68]. In addition, it is assumed that households do not 
switch back to technologies with a much lower comfort level, i.e. that 
households with modern heating systems (such as district heat, gas, 
electricity) do not choose coal or traditional biomass [following 69]. 
Since preferences are diverse, we calculate substitutions in both di-
rections, to determine the net substitution from technology i to tech-
nology j. The sum of all such pair-wise comparisons over all technologies 
yields the cumulative net change in market shares of technology j: 
ΔSj;t ¼
X
i
Si;t  1Sj;t  1
�
Fi→jτ  1i   Fj→iτ  1j
�
Δt (5) 
Formula 5 is the non-linear dynamic shares equation, conceptually 
similar to the modelling of imitation dynamics in evolutionary game 
theory [70]. 
In addition to regular end-of-lifetime replacements, households have 
the option to replace their existing functioning heating system prema-
turely. Based on economic considerations, this can be beneficial if the 
marginal running costs of operating the current system exceed the full 
costs of buying and operating an alternative technology. It is known that 
empirically, households only consider such a premature replacement if 
the potential savings exceed the initial investment in a limited period of 
time, usually around three years [71]. The original model specification 
of FTT:Heat is therefore based on such a behavioural payback threshold, 
as an approximation of observed real-world choices. However, such 
behaviour may at least partly be attributable to loss aversion. Therefore, 
here we assume that households apply the same type of rationality as for 
regular replacements, and apply the same discount rate (assuming a rate 
of 9%, the equivalent payback threshold is around 9 years). This means 
that the inclusion of loss aversion makes the model representation of 
premature replacements simpler (compared to the original specifica-
tion), as a separate behavioural payback threshold is not needed any 
longer. 
2.4. Policy scenarios 
For demonstrating the modified version of FTT:Heat and the rele-
vance of loss aversion, we simulate as an example a current trends 
scenario and four policy scenarios, all aiming at a decarbonisation of 
residential heating [based on previous work, see 51]:  
� Scenario a projects the current technological trajectory into the future. 
It implicitly considers existing policies (the impact of which on 
technology preferences is implicitly captured by the ‘intangible’ cost 
components, which were empirically derived from recent diffusion 
data), but does not introduce new policies.  
� Scenarios b and c simulate a residential carbon tax of 100 €/tCO2 
and 200 €/tCO2, respectively, which is added to the household price 
of fossil fuels from 2020 onwards.  
� Scenario d simulates a technology subsidy of 50%, which is paid on 
the upfront investment costs of heat pumps, solar thermal and 
modern biomass systems from 2020 onwards.  
� Scenario e simulates the combined effect of the 100 €/tCO2 carbon 
tax and the technology subsidy. 
For the purpose of this analysis, it is assumed that the same policy 
instruments are implemented in all 59 simulated world regions. This is 
done for comparing global emissions changes with and without loss 
aversion, as an easy reference for the full climate change impact that loss 
aversion could have. It does not imply that such a global implementation 
of policy instruments is in fact preferable, or that all countries should 
implement the same policies. 
In the ‘current technological trajectory’ and all policy scenarios, we 
assume a parallel decarbonisation of the power sector which is consis-
tent with limiting global warming to 1.5 �C, as described in [51,72]. This 
reduces the projected indirect emissions of heating with 
electricity-based technologies, independently of any developments in 
the residential heating sector. 
When a carbon tax is introduced, the tax increases the energy costs of 
fossil fuel technologies. According on local energy prices, the policy is 
designed to make renewables competitive in terms of overall costs. 
However, parity in total costs does not change the fact that both tech-
nology groups can have reversed cost dimensions: while the carbon tax 
further increases the relative advantage of low-carbon technologies in 
terms of operating costs, the policy does not reduce their relative 
disadvantage in terms of higher upfront investment costs. Because losses 
loom larger than gains for loss-averse decision-makers, a relatively 
stronger change in relative energy costs should be necessary for 
obtaining the same effect on technology uptake as it would be projected 
without loss aversion. If the coefficient of loss aversion is around two (as 
in our assumptions), it should therefore be expected that the carbon tax 
under loss aversion would need to be around twice as high, for obtaining 
the same impact on technology diffusion as under rational decision- 
making without loss aversion. For the same reason, upfront subsidies 
should be relatively more effective in impacting technology choices than 
a carbon tax: a carbon tax increases the size of relative gains from 
switching to renewables (in form of energy cost reductions), while the 
subsidy reduces the size of relative losses, which are valued by the loss 
aversion coefficient. 
3. Results 
3.1. Simulation results at the global level 
Fig. 3 shows the projected global heat generation by technology type 
6 Due to the asymmetric nature of reference-dependent loss aversion, the 
sampling of choice distributions by means of numerical Monte Carlo simula-
tions is conceptually more straightforward than to find an analytical repre-
sentation of probability distributions.  
7 For each individual region, historic technology market shares were 
compiled from data on final energy demand by households (grouped by fuel 
type), combined with data on the stock and sales of different heating technol-
ogies [for a detailed description of the database, see [51,52]. 
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and resulting CO2 emissions (direct emissions plus indirect emissions 
from electricity generation) for scenarios a-e, with and without loss 
aversion. The corresponding differences in technology market shares 
can be seen in Fig. 4, for 2015 (the start of the simulation) and 2050. 
Fig. 5 shows these differences for a range of loss aversion coefficients, in 
comparison to the effect of different discount rates. 
In all scenarios, the projected diffusion of renewable and highly 
efficient heating technologies (solar thermal, modern biomass and heat 
pumps; renewables from hereon) is much faster under decision-making 
without accounting for loss aversion, compared to the model specifica-
tion with loss aversion. At the start of the simulation in 2015, renew-
ables have a global market share of 9%. Until 2050, under the current 
technological trajectory without additional policies, this share is pro-
jected to autonomously increase to 39% without loss aversion (for 
details, see 51), but this declines to 22% when loss aversion is included. 
In other words, not considering loss aversion in the behavioural as-
sumptions overestimates the baseline uptake of renewables by around 
80% on the global level. 
In both model specifications, the carbon tax and the subsidy are 
projected to increase the uptake of renewables, relative to current 
trends. However, not considering loss aversion in the model over-
estimates the policy impact considerably: projected global market shares 
of renewables in 2050 are around 6–18% points higher, compared to the 
model specification with loss aversion (see Fig. 4). Consistent with our 
expectations, differences in the projected uptake of renewables are 
smaller for more stringent policy scenarios. While the model specifica-
tion without loss aversion would project a 56% larger diffusion of re-
newables for a carbon tax of 100 €/tCO2, the relative gap is reduced to 
Fig. 3. Global heat generation by technology and resulting CO2 emissions. Direct and indirect CO2 emissions (from electricity generation) from 2005 to 2050, 
under the current technological trajectory (a) and in three policy scenarios (b–e), as simulated by FTT:Heat. Panels on the left show the simulation results for 
decision-making which is subject to loss aversion, panels on the right for decision-making without loss aversion. Vertical lines indicate the start of the model 
simulation in 2015. Percentage values refer to the change in total CO2 emissions in 2050, relative to their level in 2015 (values in brackets refer to direct CO2 
emissions only). In the right panels, dashed lines indicate the level of CO2 emissions as simulated under loss aversion. 
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33% for a carbon tax of 200 €/tCO2, and to 21% for an upfront subsidy 
for renewables. This suggests that subsidies are indeed a more effective 
way for bridging the gap between the technology compositions with and 
without loss aversion (see Fig. 4). In case of very strong policy in-
centives, the resulting cost differences between technologies become so 
large that they eventually start to dominate the influence of loss aversion 
on choices, and households prefer the cheapest option despite their bias 
towards status-quo technologies. When the carbon tax is combined with 
upfront subsidies, for example, the relative gap between the projected 
market shares of renewables in both model specifications is reduced to 
12%. 
The projected differences in technology uptake directly impact levels 
of CO2 emissions by residential heating (see Fig. 3). Under current 
trends, including decarbonisation of the power sector, annual emissions 
are projected to decrease by 25% until 2050 when assuming loss aver-
sion in the decision-making, compared to 46% without loss aversion. 
With loss aversion, a carbon tax of 200 €/tCO2 leads to similar 
reductions in total emission levels (  76%) than a carbon tax of 100 
€/tCO2 without loss aversion (  74%). From that perspective, it appears 
indeed to be an approximately correct rule of thumb that in this model, 
when the coefficient of loss aversion is around two, the same reductions 
in overall emissions are obtained with policy incentives twice as strin-
gent. Similar as for the underlying trends of technology diffusion, the 
difference between both model specifications decreases with the strin-
gency of the policy instruments. For example, the 200 €/tCO2 carbon tax 
leads to comparable reductions in total emission levels with and without 
loss aversion (  76% and   77%, see Fig. 3).8 
Even when the resulting emission reductions are almost identical 
Fig. 4. Projected differences in global market shares of heating technologies. Stacked bars show the differences in market shares (measured in percentage 
points, p.p.) that would result from loss aversion in the model, relative to the model specification without loss aversion. Differences are shown for 2030 and 2050, 
under the current technological trajectory (a) and in four policy scenarios (b–e). 
Fig. 5. Sensitivity of market shares in 2050 towards loss aversion and discounting. Stacked bars show the differences in projected market shares for 2050 in the 
‘current technological trajectory’ (measured in percentage points, p.p.) that would result from different degrees of loss aversion (A), and different discount rates (B). 
All differences are relative to the model specification without loss aversion (λ ¼ 1) and a discount rate of 9%. 
8 Note that beyond a certain level, the marginal impact of additional policy 
incentives on technology diffusion is limited by the inertia of the technological 
system, foremost the physical turnover rate of heating systems (which have an 
average assumed technical lifetime of 20 years). 
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(like in scenarios c and e), the underlying technology mix remains 
substantially different in its composition, as different types of low- 
carbon technologies are preferred with and without the model repre-
sentation of loss aversion in the decision-making (see Fig. 4). In case of 
the 200 €/tCO2 carbon tax, for example, both model specifications result 
in very similar overall market shares of fossil fuel technologies in 2050. 
However, even given a similar degree of decarbonisation, there remain 
large differences in low-carbon technology market shares. With loss 
aversion, there is a much larger reliance on low-carbon technologies 
with larger market shares at the start of the simulation, such as tradi-
tional biomass, district heating, or direct electric heating. Without loss 
aversion, in contrast, there is a relatively larger market penetration of 
relatively newer technologies such as heat pumps and solar, which only 
have small market shares in 2015. As these technologies also tend to be 
relatively more efficient, the model specification without loss aversion 
underestimates global annual net expenses on heating (upfront plus 
running costs, excluding carbon tax payments) in 2050 by around 13% 
(in scenario c), compared to the projections without loss aversion. 
The projected changes in technology choices due to loss aversion are 
substantially different from the changes that result from an adjustment 
of the discount rate in the model, as can be seen in Fig. 5. When the 
discount rate is increased, the relative importance of future energy costs 
decreases, which implies a shift of household choices towards technol-
ogies with relatively lower upfront costs. Higher degrees of loss aver-
sion, on the other hand, imply a ‘conservative shift’ of household choices 
towards technologies with relatively larger market shares, indepen-
dently of the relative importance of upfront and future energy costs. For 
example, increasing the loss aversion coefficient leads to a higher mar-
ket penetration of biomass and fossil-fuel based heating systems 
(including oil and coal), at the expense of all types of low-carbon tech-
nologies. Increasing the discount rate, on the other hand, leads to a shift 
of market shares within the group of renewables, towards relatively less 
capital-intensive low-carbon technologies (e.g., air-source heat pumps 
instead of solar thermal systems). 
3.2. Simulation results for selected countries 
The effects of loss aversion on projected technology uptake is further 
illustrated at the example of individual countries, as shown in Fig. 6 for 
the cases of Germany, Ireland, Korea, Spain, and the USA. These five 
countries were chosen to represent different historical technology 
compositions in the residential heating sector, which allows to analyse 
the influence of loss aversion under different regional contexts. 
In Germany and the USA, the overall shares of fossil and renewable 
technologies are more or less the same under both model specifications. 
Despite this, there remain substantial differences in terms of individual 
technology shares. Within the group of fossil technologies, advanced (i. 
e., more efficient) variants of gas and oil boilers diffuse faster without 
loss aversion. Similarly, within the group of renewable technologies, not 
considering loss aversion results in a larger projected uptake of (rela-
tively more efficient) ground-source and (relatively more expensive) air- 
water heat pumps, relative to the cheaper variant of air-air heat pumps 
(and also larger shares of direct electric heating). 
Differences under the ‘current technological trajectory’ are more 
obvious in case of Ireland, Korea and Spain. In Ireland, coal keeps 
playing an important role in the heating market until 2050 with loss 
aversion, while it is largely replaced by advanced biomass systems 
without loss aversion. Both in Ireland and Korea, renewables hardly see 
any growth with loss aversion, but are projected to replace substantial 
capacities of oil heating systems without loss aversion. In Spain, the 
market share of solar thermal is projected to increase substantially in 
both model specifications, but is more than twice as large without loss 
aversion. Importantly, in all cases the model projections are almost 
identical to each other at the beginning of the simulation: it is only over 
time that the differences from loss aversion gain a visible impact, 
eventually accumulate and become path-dependent. 
In each country, the respective effect of loss aversion foremost de-
pends on the observed technology market shares at the start of the 
simulation. The initial market shares in each country determine how 
many consumers consider a certain heating technology as their ‘status 
quo’ option. In direct comparison of two technologies, the ‘status quo’ 
technology always has a relative advantage due to loss aversion. In 
practice, this means that loss aversion favours the selection of more 
traditional technologies, such as gas or electric resistance heating, which 
currently are the ‘status quo’ in many households. For the same reason, 
the attractiveness of switching to relatively newer alternatives, such as 
heat pumps, is relatively lower under loss aversion. As a result, under 
loss aversion, switching between any pair of technologies becomes much 
more unlikely, and the technology composition is more likely to remain 
as it is. 
The pattern of differences between model specifications with and 
without loss aversion persists when the effect of a carbon tax (100 
€/tCO2) is simulated. In both cases the policy increases the share of 
renewables in all five countries, relative to the ‘current technological 
trajectory’. However, as on the global level, the projected share of re-
newables is larger in the model specification without loss aversion. Also, 
the model projections differ substantially with regard to the degree of 
decarbonisation, and the technology pathway that leads to this decar-
bonisation: In all five countries, market shares of fossil technologies in 
2050 are projected to be lower without loss aversion. Furthermore, more 
efficient and capital-intensive variants of renewable technologies tend 
to be chosen when loss aversion is not considered. The latter is perhaps 
most striking in case of Spain, where the portfolio of renewables be-
comes dominated by (relatively cheap) air-air heat pumps under 
decision-making with loss aversion, and by (relatively capital-intensive) 
solar thermal installations without loss aversion. 
4. Discussion 
4.1. Impact of loss aversion on technology uptake 
The different projections of technology uptake with and without loss 
aversion can be traced back to the asymmetric valuation of losses and 
gains under reference-dependent decision-making. Based on the tech-
nology assumptions in FTT:Heat, renewable heating technologies have 
relatively higher upfront costs (compared to fossil fuel-based systems), 
but also a relatively higher degree of energy efficiency. Prospect Theory 
suggests that due to loss aversion, the relative disadvantage (loss) of 
higher upfront costs has a relatively stronger impact on decisions than 
the advantage in energy costs (gain), when evaluated from the reference 
point of fossil-fuel technologies. Importantly, the effect of loss aversion 
on choices is asymmetric, as the classification of gains and losses always 
depends on the reference point. For example, switching from a gas boiler 
to a heat pump is evaluated differently than switching from a heat pump 
to a gas boiler. Both situations imply different perspectives on what is 
perceived as gains and losses, and hence different evaluations of tech-
nology switching. 
The expected influence of loss aversion on technology uptake can be 
interpreted as a manifestation of the ‘status quo’ [49]: People tend to 
prefer technologies which are already familiar to them, which increases 
the likelihood of choosing the ‘status quo’ option – even if it should, 
rationally, result in higher overall monetary costs from an engineering 
perspective. Accordingly, the projected trajectory of technology diffu-
sion becomes subject to a ‘conservative shift’, in which future technol-
ogy choices are more dependent on current market shares. This is 
reflected in the observation that technologies that have low market 
shares at the start of the simulation have a disadvantage, which happen 
to be the same technologies that have higher upfront costs (low-carbon 
technologies are capital-intensive). 
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4.2. Implications for the design of policies 
In the context of climate change mitigation, policy incentives such as 
taxes and subsidies are typically meant to ensure that low-carbon 
technologies can financially compete with fossil-fuel technologies. 
However, loss aversion implies that competitiveness in overall costs is 
not always sufficient for achieving a market diffusion of new technolo-
gies, as perceived losses can have a relatively stronger impact on de-
cisions. This implies that policies may need to become much more 
stringent to overcome the loss aversion effect, and that it may prove 
more effective for policies to aim at reducing relative disadvantages 
(losses, such as higher upfront costs via the payment of subsidies), than 
aiming at further increasing relative advantages (gains, such as lower 
energy costs). Furthermore, given the reported heterogeneity of loss 
version between people, policies could in principle be designed differ-
ently for different target groups, for example based on age or income 
[32]. This was not simulated here, and requires further research. 
From the perspective of economic welfare analysis, loss aversion 
implies that technology choices of individual households can become 
inconsistent with their own long-term preferences, which can justify 
policy intervention [10]. Ideally, interventions should contribute to 
reduce the effect of loss aversion by providing information to people 
how it influences their decision-making. However, given that it is likely 
a deeply-wired pattern in human behaviour, it could be hard or even 
impossible to overcome on a fundamental cognitive level [30]. Most 
likely, it is therefore not possible to directly influence the degree of loss 
aversion of individuals. As an alternative, the design of information 
policies could take into account the influence of loss aversion on 
decision-making. For example, information campaigns could be framed 
in a way that not investing in renewable technologies becomes perceived 
as a loss, which households want to avoid. However, while this could be 
effective in theory, Nicolson et al. [35] report that loss-framed messages 
were not effective in the case of choosing electricity tariffs. 
Fig. 6. Simulated heat generation by technology in five exemplarily chosen countries. Heat generation between 2005 and 2050, with and without consid-
eration of loss aversion in the model. Panels on the left show the simulation results for the current technological trajectory, panels on the right for a carbon tax of 100 
€/tCO2. Vertical lines indicate the start of the model simulation in 2015. 
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4.3. Implications for modelling 
From the perspective of modelling, it is important to underline that 
the influence of loss aversion does not simply correspond to an under-
valuation of future energy savings, as they would be captured by 
(behaviourally estimated) time preferences or discount rates. In both 
model specifications, discounting is applied to all gains and losses in the 
exact same way, depending on the year in which they occur. In contrast, 
loss aversion is only applied to subjectively perceived losses, depending 
on the reference point. A representation of loss aversion by an adjust-
ment of cost attributes or discount rates would thus be inaccurate: it 
would ignore the dependence of choices on the current technology 
stock, and would instead lead to an overly simplistic preference-shift 
towards less capital-intensive technologies (as illustrated in Fig. 5). 
Instead, loss aversion requires a different model representation of 
decision-making — not only for our example of heating systems, but 
potentially for all technology choices made by individuals (e.g., cars or 
electric appliances). Ideally, such representations are not limited to loss 
aversion, but could also include further empirical findings on decision- 
making, behavioural biases and their possible interactions (Shogren 
and Taylor [12] point out that 25 biases are relevant to economic 
decision-making, which implies 125 possible interaction effects between 
biases). 
4.4. Limitations and uncertainties 
Including loss aversion in models is a significant step forward in the 
context of positive modelling methods to appraise possible policy stra-
tegies. However, it remains unclear so far what causes loss aversion on a 
fundamental cognitive level. While the estimated loss aversion coeffi-
cient is around two on average, there is evidence for a considerable 
variation between product types and individuals. For example, rela-
tively stronger loss aversion is found for durable product categories [for 
a meta-analysis, see 21]. Gaechter et al. [48] found that loss aversion 
increases with an individual’s age, income and wealth, while higher 
education decreases loss aversion. It therefore remains uncertain what is 
the exact degree of loss aversion for the choice of different types of 
energy technologies, to which extent it differs between different con-
sumers and countries, and how it depends on the context of 
decision-making. While we have assumed that loss aversion is identical 
around the globe, further research could also account for variations in 
loss aversion between countries and cultures [6,73]. 
More generally, one has to be careful with the generalisation of 
Prospect Theory to societal contexts that differ from those under which 
experiments were made. In particular, although loss aversion has been 
observed in a variety of contexts for individual decision-making, it re-
mains unclear to which extent it also applies to groups of people, which 
is of interest for energy models and policy-making. It is arguably an 
oversimplifying generalisation that the group behaves like an individ-
ual, an assumption commonly made in economics with the use of the 
representative agent [74]. In reality, it is not clear that all agents eval-
uate choice options using similar reasoning, and to which degree agents 
influence each other [66,75]. While agents may exhibit loss aversion 
when facing choices individually, this effect could be weaker or stronger 
in social contexts. 
From an anthropological perspective, decision-making can be seen 
under three different theoretical lenses [76]: (1) the self-interested 
(utilitarian) model, used in microeconomics, in which choices are 
directed by individual utility; (2) the social model in which decisions are 
made by social groups, and (3) the moral model in which agents make 
decisions according to beliefs, values, culture and tradition. The loss 
aversion concept belongs to the utilitarian paradigm, and makes no 
reference to group or cultural dynamics, which could in principle be 
stronger than individual utilitarian biases. Nevertheless, our results 
suggest clearly that despite omitting other possible group-related dy-
namics or cultural influences, the ex-ante evaluation of policy strategies 
could be much better informed if loss aversion is included in policy 
analyses. 
Overall, the FTT:Heat model and its loss aversion component are 
based on the best available empirical knowledge about consumer 
decision-making. The model is based on a rich empirical data set of 
historical technology diffusion and the modelling of loss aversion is 
based on experiments from a wide range of decision-making contexts. 
Furthermore, its simulations for the near future are consistent with 
observed technology choices in the past [51,52]. Still, it remains an 
unsolved question how the model’s projections of policy effectiveness 
can be validated for the (more distant) future, given that the model aims 
to simulate policy-induced technological change which has no direct 
precedence in human history. Ambitious decarbonisation policies are 
outside of what has so far been implemented in most countries, and little 
is known on how people react to these policies under real-world con-
ditions. Furthermore, the context of technology choices in energy tran-
sitions is constantly evolving. This makes it inherently uncertain to 
which extent model structures and parameters remain valid in the 
(distant) future, or if they might need to be adjusted in the light of new 
developments. For example, will human decision-making on energy 
technologies at one point be supplemented by artificial intelligence, and 
how would this change the impact of behavioural biases such as loss 
aversion? 
5. Conclusion 
We started from the question how loss aversion can be included into 
a simulation-based energy model, and to which extent it influences 
model projections of technological change and the effectiveness of 
climate policies, both on the global level and on the level of individual 
countries. We find that the model representation of loss aversion is not 
only feasible, but also relevant. Its consideration substantially reduces 
the projected uptake of renewable and energy-efficient technologies, as 
well as the projected impact of market-based policy instruments. 
On the level of individual decision-making, we have shown that loss 
aversion leads to stronger preferences for technologies that are already 
established in the market, and are therefore likely perceived as the 
subjective reference points of individual consumers. When comparing 
two technology options from a subjective reference point, loss aversion 
implies that relative disadvantages (losses) have a larger impact on de-
cisions than relative advantages (gains). If consumers see higher upfront 
investment costs as a loss and future energy savings as a gain, this results 
in a relatively lower valuation of renewable and energy-efficient tech-
nologies. Even if they are seen as overall more attractive than fossil fuel 
technologies from an outside engineering perspective, consumers are 
more likely to stick with their current technology. 
In our example of heating technology uptake, not considering loss 
aversion overestimates the global market shares of renewables in 2050 
by up to 80% and underestimates future levels of residential CO2 
emissions by around 30%, compared to the improved model specifica-
tion with loss aversion. Accordingly, loss aversion implies the need for 
much stronger policy instruments for achieving decarbonisation targets 
for residential heating: A carbon tax of 200 €/tCO2 is projected to reduce 
overall emission levels to a similar extent than a carbon tax of 100 
€/tCO2 without the consideration of loss aversion. The differences are 
thus so large that the loss aversion effect influences outcomes as much as 
the policies, and policies may need to become around twice as stringent 
to overcome the loss aversion effect. In the absence of global policy 
regimes for the decarbonisation of energy end-use sectors, accounting 
for loss aversion is most relevant for policy-making on the level of in-
dividual countries or regions (such as the European Union), as we have 
illustrated for five exemplarily chosen countries. 
More empirical research is required in order to better understand 
how loss aversion can help to explain the uptake pathways of different 
types of energy technologies, along with the question to which extent 
loss aversion differs between consumers and countries. In particular, it is 
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important to improve our understanding of choice dynamics in different 
social and cultural contexts, making use both of controlled behavioural 
experiments and the evaluation of choices under real-world conditions. 
The consideration of such insights for energy modelling is still in its 
infancy, and more work is required on the integration of behavioural 
knowledge into simulation models of technology uptake. 
In conclusion, our findings suggest that loss aversion has major im-
plications for the modelling of energy technology uptake, as well as for 
the planning and ex-ante evaluation of policies, and warrant substantial 
further investigation. 
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